A new paper says shareholder voting on executive pay doesn't improve compensation practices.
A Stanford research team proposes changes to credit default swaps to lower the risks of sovereign default.
Why bankers like leverage—and what that could mean for the global financial system.
Given the pervasiveness of social media, should the board of directors pay closer attention to the information exchanged on these sites? Can this information be used to improve oversight and risk management?
In a Reuters oped, Professor Anat Admati argues that bank dividend payouts to shareholders expose "the economy to unnecessary risks without valid justification."
David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan at the Corporate Governance Research Program examine succession plans, what a board can do if the market reacts positively to the death of its CEO, and whether the board should revise its succession plan if its CEO engages in risky hobbies or lifestyle habits.
A letter by Anat R. Admati and Neil M. Barofsky published by the Financial Times, March 8, 2012
After analyzing repurchase agreements by money-market funds and security lenders, these researchers believe that banks off-balance-sheet collateralization of commercial paper is more likely to have prompted the run on short-term debt financing in the recent financial crisis.
When they are wrong about quarterly earnings forecasts, analysts may stubbornly stick to their erroneous views, a tendency that might contribute to market bubbles and busts, according to research coauthored by John Beshears of the Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Originally published by Thomson Reuters-GRC, June 14, 2011.
