Jeffrey Zwiebel
James C. Van Horne Professor of Finance
Phone: (650) 723-2917
Email: [email protected]
Academic Areas: Finance
Jeffrey Zwiebel’s research focuses on the fields of corporate finance, organizations, the theory of the firm, and microeconomic theory. Particular topics of research interest include financial contracting, bargaining theory, intrafirm bargaining, contract theory, organizational design, political and social belief formation, corporate governance, executive compensation, capital structure, mergers and acquisitions, corporate valuation, and the economics of sports.
Bio
Jeffrey Zwiebel is the James C. Van Horne Professor of Finance at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. His research focuses on the fields of corporate finance, organizations, the theory of the firm, and microeconomic theory. Recent and ongoing research includes work on executive compensation, financial contracting, bargaining theory, mergers and acquisitions, persuasion bias in political and social belief formation and transmission, and the “hot-hand” in sports.
Jeff has taught MBA classes on Corporate Finance, Corporate Valuation, and Mergers and Acquisitions, and PhD classes on Corporate Finance Theory. He has been a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution and has received an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship. Jeff received his PhD in Economics at MIT. He received an AB in Economics (with highest honors) at Princeton, where he also received the Halbert White ’72 Prize for the outstanding student in the economics department, and the Wolf Balleison Prize for the outstanding senior thesis in economics.
Academic Degrees
PhD, M.I.T., 1991; AB, Princeton Univ., 1987
Professional Experience
At Stanford since 1991.
National Fellow, Hoover Institution, 1996; Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, 1996.
Selected Publications
- Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants: Review of Financial Studies, 2007
- Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Unidimensional Opinions: Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003
- Intrafirm Bargaining Under Nonbinding Contracts: Review of Economic Studies, 1996
- Dynamic Capital Structure Under Managerial Entrenchment: American Economic Review 86, 1996
- Corporate Conservatism and Relative Compensation: Journal of Political Economy 103, 1995
Working Papers
- 1205: Corporate Conservatism, Herd Behavior and Relative Compensation
- 1235: A Control Theory of Dynamic Capital Structure
- 1255: Organizational Design and Technology Choice with Nonbinding Contracts
- 1324: Intrafirm Bargaining Under Nonbinding Contracts
- 1325: Organizational Design and Technology Choice Under Intrafirm Bargaining
- 1326: Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control
- 1719: Persuasion Bias, Social Influence, and Uni-Dimensional Opinions
Courses Taught
- FINANCE 214: Accelerated Corporate Finance: Applications, Techniques, and Models
- FINANCE 624: Corporate Finance Theory
Affiliations
- National Fellow: Hoover Institution