Yossi Feinberg’s research centers on the analysis of information in strategic decision making. He works on the modeling of costly decision making, reasoning about unawareness, dynamic interactive decisions, reasoning about high order uncertainties, and more. Some of his work includes a method for the novice to test a potential experts who claim to be informed of some uncertain future events, a study on how uncertainties about others’ uncertainties can lead to delay in bargaining and the modeling of strategic communication.

Yossi Feinberg received his PhD in Mathematics from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in 1997. His thesis studied how differing prior beliefs of decision makers can be expressed by their disagreement on current (posterior) events. After completing his dissertation under the supervision of Nobel Laureate Professor Robert J. Aumann, Yossi began teaching economics at Kellogg Graduate School of Management. Yossi joined Stanford GSB in 1998.

Yossi’s teaching interests include Economics of Organization, Managerial Economics, Strategy, Information Markets, Game Theory and Applied Decision Making. In 2003 he received the MBA distinguished teaching award.

Yossi’s recent research interests include, for example, the analysis and implication of strategic decision making in the face of unawareness. He has modeled games with unawareness and their solutions. In these games each decision maker can reason about the extent to which others may only have a limited perception of the full scale of the economic interaction at hand. Yossi is currently an Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory and has been serving as a referee for all major microeconomics journals. He has given numerous invited seminars as well as multiple plenary talks at academic conferences.

He has been consulting in a wide range of industries including hi-tech, media and healthcare as well as giving invited talks on topics such as pricing, the sub-prime crisis, in-house vs. outsourcing, allocating decision power in organizations and strategic interactions.