Professor Mark G. Kelman's most recent research has focused on the implications of the debate over the nature of heuristic reasoning for a variety of legal theoretic and policy issues (including methods of rediuing crime, debates over whether values are incommensurable, debates over whether there are significant, universal "moral" beliefs.

A prolific scholar whose jurisprudential interests range from law and economics to cognitive psychology, Mark G. Kelman has applied social science approaches to diverse legal fields including criminal law, taxation, administrative regulation, and disability law. His most recent research has focused on the implications of the debate over the nature of heuristic reasoning for a variety of legal theoretic and policy issues (including methods of rediuing crime, debates over whether values are incommensurable, debates over whether there are significant, universal "moral" beliefs. In addition to being a long-time teacher of both criminal law and property law to first-year students, he has served as the academic coordinator, academic associate dean, and vice dean at the law school. Before joining the Stanford Law School faculty in 1977, Professor Kelman was the Director of Criminal Justice Projects for the Fund for the City of New York.