CP/IR Workshop - Jessica Gottlieb

Abstract: I argue that if citizens systematically underestimate what their government can and should do for them, then they will hold politicians to a lower standard and sanction poor performers less often. A large-scale experiment across 95 localities in Mali in which some voters received information about potential government performance identifies effects of raising voter expectations. Survey experiments on the intent to vote (N=5,560) suggest that people in treated villages are indeed more likely to sanction poor performers and vote based on performance more often. There is also support for the idea that voting is a strategic calculation in which an individual’s actions are contingent on beliefs about others: treatment improved voter coordination and worked better when provided to a majority of villages. A
behavioral outcome – the likelihood that villagers challenge local leaders at a town hall meeting – adds external validity to survey findings. Contrary to expectations, increasing voter information appears to decrease politician transparency, at least in the short-run.

Jessica Gottlieb is a PhD Candidate specializing in Comparative Politics with a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa.  She studies political behavior, institutions, and government performance in developing countries.  Her dissertation demonstrates how low voter expectations, collusion among political parties, and social inequalities together undermine electoral accountability in Mali.  In her past and current research, Gottlieb combines extensive field work, sound research design and rigorous methods such as field, survey and behavioral experiments.  She received an MA in Economics from Stanford in 2011 and expects to complete the PhD in Political Science by June 2013.

Last modified Wednesday, November 14, 2012 - 12:47am