@article {1333,
	title = {Delocation and Trade Agreements in Imperfectly Competitive Markets (with Robert Staiger)},
	year = {2009},
	month = {06/2009},
	abstract = {<p> We consider the purpose and design of trade agreements in imperfectly competitive environments featuring firm-delocation effects. In both the segmented-market Cournot and the <br /> integrated-market monopolistic competition settings where these effects have been identified,<br /> we show that the only rationale for a trade agreement is to remedy the inefficiency attributable<br /> to the terms-of-trade externality, the same rationale that arises in perfectly competitive markets. <br /> Furthermore, and again as in the perfectly competitive benchmark case, we show that the <br /> principle of reciprocity is efficiency enhancing, as it serves to &quot;undo&quot; the terms-of-trade driven <br /> inefficiency that occurs when governments pursue unilateral trade policies. Our results therefore<br /> ~indicate that the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements applies to a broader set of market <br /> structures than previously thought. </p>},
	url = {http://economics.stanford.edu/files/workp/swp08001.pdf},
	author = {Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger}
}