Fuhito Kojima
Assistant Professor
Contact Info:
[email protected]
http://sites.google.com/site/fuhitokojimaeconomics/
Page in Stanford Directory
Phone: 650-725-2620
Office: Landau Economics, room 239
Office hours: On leave 2011-12
Interests
- Research:
Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Market Design, Political Economics
- Current Research:
Analysis of matching/assignment mechanisms in large economies, practical market design for schools
- Teaching:
Game Theory, Market Design
- Professional Affiliations:
AEA, Econometric Society
Recent Publications
(1) Robust Stability in Matching Markets (2010), forthcoming, Theoretical Economics.
(2) Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts (2010), with John William Hatfield, forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory.
(3) A Theory of Hung Juries and Informative Voting (2009), with Yuki Takagi, forthcoming, Games and Economic Behavior.
(4) Group Incentive Compatibility for Matching with Contracts (2009), with John William Hatfield, Games and Economic Behavior, 67, p.745-749
(5) Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms (2008), with Yeon-Koo Che, forthcoming, Econometrica.
(6) Axioms for Deferred Acceptance (2009), with Mihai Manea, forthcoming, Econometrica.
(7) Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009), with Parag A. Pathak, American Economic Review 99, pp 608–27.
(8) Incentives in the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism (2010), with Mihai Manea, Journal of Economic Theory, 145, pp 106-123.
(9) Risk-Dominance and Perfect Foresight Dynamics in N-Player Games (2006), Journal of Economic Theory 128, pp 255-273.
List of Stanford Working Papers
Current Courses
Education
Harvard University, Ph.D. Economics, University of Tokyo, B. A. Economics