Ilya R. Segal

Department of Economics
Stanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
Tel. (650) 724-4905
[email protected]
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Academic Positions

� 2002 � present: ��� Roy and Betty Anderson Professor in the Humanities and Sciences, Department of Economics, Stanford University (Courtesy appointment, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 2004-present)

� 1999 � 2002: ������ Associate Professor of Economics, Stanford University

� 1995 � 1998: ������ Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Berkeley

Visiting Positions

� Visiting Researcher, Microsoft Research Silicon Valley, Summer 2008��������

� Member, The Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, 2002-2003

� John Stauffer National Fellow in Public Policy, Hoover Institution, 1998 � 1999

� Visiting Assistant Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fall 1995

Education

� Harvard University, Ph.D., Economics, 1995. Advisors: Eric Maskin, Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer

� Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, M.S., Applied Mathematics, 1991

Research and Teaching Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Contract Theory, Industrial Organization, Theory of the Firm

Honors, Awards, Grants

� 2008 Compass Lexecon Prize for �the most significant contribution to the understanding and implementation of competition policy� (joint with Michael Whinston)

� Toulouse Network on Information Technology, Member, 2005-present

� Econometric Society Fellow, elected in 2003

� John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation Fellowship, 2002-2003

� Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship, 1999-2001

� National Science Foundation Research Grants 1998-2000, 2000-2002, 2002-2004, 2004-2005, 2004-2006, 2010-2012

� Review of Economic Studies European Meetings, 1995

� Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Dissertation Fellow, 1994-95

� Pew Foundation Visiting Scholar, Harvard University, 1991-92

Publications (in PDF)

Refereed Journal Articles�� �

��� �The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and Supporting Prices,� with Noam Nisan, Journal of Economic Theory 129(1), July 2006, pp. 192-224

�        �Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities,� with Michael Whinston, Econometrica, 71(3) 2003, pp. 757-791

��� �Optimal Pricing Mechanisms with Unknown Demand,� American Economic Review 93(3), 2003, pp. 509-529

� �� �Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining,� Review of Economic Studies 70(2), 2003, pp. 439-460

� �� �Coordination and Discrimination in Contracting with Externalities: Divide and Conquer?� Journal of Economic Theory 113(2), 2003, pp. 147-181

� �� �Communication Complexity and Coordination by Authority,� Advances in Theoretical Economics, forthcoming

� �� �Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets,� with Paul Milgrom, Econometrica 70(2), 2002, pp. 583-601

� �� �The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-Up and Risk Sharing),� with Michael Whinston, Econometrica 70(1), 2002, pp. 1-45

���� �https://="https://www.stanford.edu/~isegal/rje_Winter'00_Segal.pdf">Exclusive Contracts and Protection of Investments,� with Michael Whinston, RAND Journal of Economics 31(4), 2000, pp. 603-633

� �� �Naked Exclusion: Comment,� with Michael Whinston, American Economic Review 90(1), 2000, pp. 296-309

� �� �Contracting with Externalities,� Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(2), 1999, pp. 337-388

� �� �Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts,� Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 1999, pp. 57-82

� �� �Monopoly and Soft Budget Constraint,� RAND Journal of Economics 29(3), Autumn 1998, pp. 596-609

Refereed Conference Proceedings

�        �Exponential Communication Inefficiency of Demand Queries," with Noam Nisan, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 158-164

���� �The Communication Cost of Selfishness: Ex Post Implementation,� with Ronald Fadel, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge X, June 2005, pp. 165-76

�        �Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication," with Liad Blumrosen and Noam Nisan, European Symposium on Algorithms, September 2003, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2832 Springer 2003, ISBN 3-540-20064-9

Invited Contributions

� �� Designing Dynamic Mechanisms, with Susan Athey, in American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97(2), May 2007, pp. 131-6

� �� Communication in Economic Mechanisms, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Application, Ninth World Congress (Econometric Society Monographs), ed. by Richard Blundell, Whitney K. Newey, and Torsten Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006

�� � Communication Requirements of Combinatorial Allocation Problems, in Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006

Other Publications

���� �Public vs. Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Survey,� European Competition Law Review, 2007, 323-32

���� Solutions Manual for �Microeconomic Theory� by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green , 1996, with Chiaki Hara and Steve Tadelis, Oxford University Press

Recent Working Papers

Professional Service

� Review of Economic Studies, Foreign Editor, 2010-present

� National Science Foundation Economics Panel, 2008-2010

� Program Committee, Bay Algorithmic Game Theory Symposia, BAGT1-BAGT4, 2006-present

� B.E. Journals in Theoretical Economics, Editor, 1999-2005

� American Economic Review Editorial Board, 2002-2005

� RAND Journal of Economics, Associate Editor, 1998-2006

� Director, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2003-2005

� Program Committee, North American Meetings of the Econometric Society, 2002 (Winter), 2004 (Winter), 2004 (Summer)

� Program Committee, 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society, August 2000

� Program Committee, ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2003, 2008

� Program Committee, Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge IX, 2003

� Segment Organizer, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004

� Organizer, Workshop on Multiparty Contracting, European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory, Gerzensee, July 2000

� Director of Graduate Studies, Economics Department, 2005-present

� Stanford University Committee on Libraries, 2004-2007

� Chair of Graduate Admissions, Economics Department, Stanford University, 2004-2005

Languages: Bilingual Russian - English, fluent in Ukrainian, basic knowledge of French 

Last Modified: August 30, 2011