B. Douglas Bernheim
Edward Ames Edmonds Professor of
Economics
Department of Economics, Stanford University
Senior Fellow, Stanford
Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR)
Research Associate, National
Bureau of Economic Research
Curriculum Vitae (pdf format)
Contact
Information
Address: Department of
Economics, Stanford
University, Stanford, CA
94305-6072
Phones: 650-725-8732
(voice), 650-725-5702 (fax)
e-mail: [email protected]
Research
Unpublished
Research Papers
�Social
Image and the 50-50 Norm: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Audience
Effects,� revised June 2008, resubmission under review at Econometrica (with James Andreoni).
�How
Much Value Do Real Estate Brokers Add?� A
Case Study,� revised July 2007 (with Jonathan Meer).
�Special Interest Politics and the
Quality of Governance,� revised October 2007 (with Navin Kartik).� Under revision; not currently available.
�Do Precommitment Opportunities Reduce Liquor Consumption?� Evidence on the Effects of Blue Laws,�
January 2007 (with Jonathan Meer and Neva
Novarro).� Under revision; not currently
available.
�Precommitment and Power in Agenda Setting,� August 2006 (with Silvia
Console Battilana). Under revision; not currently available.
�Self-Enforcing Cooperation with Graduated Punishments,� July 2004
(with Dilip Abreu and Avinash Dixit).�
Under revision; not currently available.
�Income Redistribution with Majoritarian Politics,� May 2004 (with Sita
Nataraj).� Under revision; not currently
available.
�Self-Control,
Saving, and the Low Asset Trap,� with Debraj Ray and Sevin Yeltekin, May 1999.
Recently
Published and Forthcoming Papers
�Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic
Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics,� Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming (with Antonio Rangel).
�����������
�A Solution
Concept for Majority Rule in Dynamic Settings,� Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming (with Sita Nataraj).
�The Effects of Financial
Education in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of Employers,� Economic Inquiry, forthcoming (with
Patrick Bayer and John Karl Scholz).
�Neuroeconomics: A
Sober (but Hopeful) Appraisal,� AEJ:
Microeconomics, forthcoming.
�Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics,� in
Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter (eds.), The Methodologies of Modern
Economics, Oxford University Press, forthcoming (with Antonio Rangel).
�Toward
Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics,� American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 97(2), May 2007, 464-470 (with Antonio Rangel). �(Expanded and updated version, �Beyond
Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare
Economics,� appears above.)
�The
Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making,� Econometrica 74(5), September 2006, 1161-90 (with Antonio Rangel
and Luis Rayo)
�(formerly titled �Democratic
Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting, Part 1�)
�From Neuroscience to Public
Policy: A New Economic View of Addiction,� Swedish
Economic Policy Review, 2006 (with Antonio Rangel).
�Behavioral Public Economics:
Welfare and Policy Analysis with Fallible Decision-Makers,� in Peter Diamond
and Hannu Vartianen (eds.), Institutions
and Behavioral Economics, forthcoming (with Antonio Rangel).
�Memory
and Anticipation,� Economic Journal, 115,
April 2005, 271-304 (with Raphael Thomadsen).
�How
Do Residents Manage Personal Finances?� American
Journal of Surgery, 189(2), February 2005, 134-139 (with Joel Teichman,
Patricia Cecconi, Neva Kerbeshian, Manoj Monga, Debra DaRosa, and Martin
Resnick).
�Addiction
and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes,� American
Economic Review, 94(5), December 2004, 1558-1590 (with Antonio Rangel).
�Do
Estate and Gift Taxes Affect the Timing of Private Transfers?� Journal of
Public Economics,� 88(12), December
2004, 2617-2634 (with Robert Lemke and John Karl Scholz).
�Are
Life Insurance Holdings Related to Financial Vulnerabilities?� Economic
Inquiry 41(4), October 2003, 531-54 (with Katherine Carman, Jagadeesh
Gokhale, and Laurence Kotlikoff).
�Bequests
as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle,�Journal of Political
Economy 111(4), August 2003, 733-764 (with Sergei Severinov).
�The
Mismatch Between Life Insurance and Financial Vulnerabilities: Evidence from
the Health and Retirment Survey,� American Economic Review 93(1), March
2003, 354-365 (with Lorenzo Forni, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence Kotlikoff).
�The
Effects of Financial Education in the Workplace: Evidence from a Survey of
Households,� Journal of Public Economics 87(7-8), August 2003, 1487-1519
(with Daniel M. Garrett).
�Optimal
Money Burning: Theory and Application to Corporate Dividend Policy,� Journal
of Economics and Management Science 10(4), Winter 2001, 463-507 (with Lee
Redding).
�What
Accounts for the Variation in Retirement Saving Across U.S. Households?� American
Economic Review, 91(4), September 2001, 832-857 (with Jonathan Skinner and
Steven Weinberg).
�How
Do Urology Residents Manage Personal Finances?� Urology, 57(5), 2001,
866-871 (with Joel Teichman, Eric Espinosa, Patricia Parker, Joana Meyer, Margaret
Pearle, Glenn Preminger, and Raymond Leveille).
�Education
and Saving: The Long-Term Effects of High School Financial Curriculum
Mandates,�Journal of Public Economics, 80(3), June 2001, 435-465 (with
Daniel M. Garrett and Dean Maki).
Some Highlights of Earlier Research
Note: a complete list of my
publications is contained in my curriculum vita, which can be accessed
above.
�Incomplete
Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity,� American Economic Review, 88(4),
September 1998, 902-932 (with Michael Whinston).
�Exclusive
Dealing,� Journal of Political Economy, 106(1), February 1998, 64-103
(with Michael Whinston).
�Veblen
Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption,� American Economic Review,
86(3), June 1996, 349-373 (with Laurie Simon Bagwell).
�A
Theory of Conformity,� Journal of Political Economy 102(5), October
1994, 841-877.
�How
Strong are Bequest Motives?� Evidence
Based on Estimates of the Demand for Life Insurance and Annuities,� Journal
of Political Economy 99 (5), October 1991, 899-927.
�Multimarket
Contact and Collusive Behavior,� Rand Journal of Economics 21 (1),
Spring 1990, 1-26 (with Michael Whinston).�
�Collective
Dynamic Consistency in Repeated Games,� Games and Economic Behavior 1
(4), December 1989, 295-326 (with Debraj Ray).
�Is
Everything Neutral?� Journal of Political Economy 96 (2), 1988, 308-338
(with Kyle Bagwell).�
�Coalition
Proof Nash Equilibria I: Concepts,� Journal of Economic Theory 42 (1),
June 1987, 1-12 (with Bezalel Peleg and Michael Whinston).
�On
the Voluntary and Involuntary Provision of Public Goods,� American Economic
Review 76 (4), September 1986, 789-793.
�Common
Agency,� Econometrica 54 (4), July 1986, 923-942 (with Michael
Whinston).
�Menu
Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence,� Quarterly Journal of
Economics 101 (1), February 1986, 1-31 (with Michael Whinston).
�The
Strategic Bequest Motive,� Journal of Political Economy 93 (6), December
1985, 1045-1076 (with Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers).
�Rationalizable
Strategic Behavior,� Econometrica 52 (4), July 1984, 1007-1028.
Supplemental Mathematical Appendices for Published Papers
Complete Mathematical Appendix for
�Addiction and Cue-Conditioned Decision Processes,� American Economic Review, December 2004.
Complete Mathematical Appendix for
�Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle,� Journal of Political Economy, August
2003. (To be added.)
Work in Progress
�Behavioral Welfare Economics�
�Cheating within Imperfect Cartels�
�Saving and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes� (with Antonio Rangel).
�Memory and Re-experience Utility� (with Peter Coles).
�Power and Predictability in Legislative Bargaining� (with Xiachen Fan
and Nageeb Ali)
�The Effects of Marital Status Transitions on Living Standards� (with
Laurence Kotlikoff, Katherine Carman, and Neva
Kerbeshian).
�Multidirectional Signaling� (with Sergei Severinov).
Other Links
Stanford Economics Department Home Page